Game Development Reference
In-Depth Information
Radner, R. (1996). Bounded rationality, indeter-
minacy, and the theory of the firm. The Economic
Journal , 106.
the bargainers' preferences. But laboratory
experimentation presents the opportunity to
measure or control these factors, and thus
permits bargaining to be observed in envi-
ronments for which the predictions of these
theories can be known, and therefore tested.
And when examined in this way, the evidence
supports some of the qualitative predictions
of these models, for example concerning
the effect of risk aversion on the outcome
of bargaining, while contradicting others,
concerning, for example, what constitutes
complete information about a bargaining
problem.
Smith, H. (1987). Deciding how to decide: Is there
a regress problem? In Bachrach, M., & Hurley, S.
(Eds.), Foundations of decision theory . Oxford:
Blackwell.
ENDNOTES
*
For example, the classical game theoretic
models of bargaining which date from the
work of Nash were unusually resistant to
tests with field data because their predictions
depend on difficult to observe elements of
1
With today's language style cliché one would
call it “ontologies of controlled languages”.
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