Game Development Reference
In-Depth Information
REFERENCES
Experimental data can also provide insights
into field data. More specifically, field studies, as
opposed to laboratory studies, are what economists
traditionally do, in terms of concentrating their
research efforts in studying behaviour of existing
(operational) systems or of ad hoc developed, in
order to check the validity of assumptions and of
any hypotheses made.
Conclusively, we note that any interactions
between members of a decision-making session,
as these would be described in the accompany-
ing model according to a generic process clas-
sification scheme, may build on the notion of
a co-operative game and according to various
modeling perspectives.
In thinking about coalitions, these may be for
instance formed between:
Boyd, D., & Ellison, N. B. (2007). Social Network
Sites: Definition . History, and Scholarship.
Elster, J. (Ed.). (1986). Rational Choice . Cam-
bridge University Press.
Friedman, J. W. (1991). Game Theory with Ap-
plications to Economics . Oxford University Press.
Fuchs, N. E., & Schwitter, R. (1996) 'Attempto
Controlled English (ACE)'. In Proceedings of
the First International Workshop on Controlled
Language Applications (pp. 124-136). Centre for
Computational Linguistics.
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game Theory .
MIT Press.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1967-68). Games with Incom-
plete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players.
Management Science , 14.
A working group, which is considered as
a single part of a decision-making session,
and the school management for achieving
a particular business objective. In this case,
the basis for the formation of the coalition
would be related to the achievement of a
mutually wished management of school re-
sources (e.g. improvement of a new teach-
ing subject procedure, which would be
combined with an increase in the accept-
ability or likeability rates for the pupils).
Harsanyi, J. C. (1967). Games with Incomplete
Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, I: The
Basic Model. Management Science , 14 (3), 159.
doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159
Harsanyi, J. C. (1968a). Games with Incomplete
Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, II:
Bayesian Equilibrium Points. Management Sci-
ence , 14 (5), 320. doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.5.320
Two working groups representing parts
of two distinct decision-making sessions,
both involved in the same decision-making
process. In this case, the involved groups
may identify a window of opportunity for
forming a coalition for achieving their
(perhaps common) goal. In any case, even
when considering the case of two competi-
tive working groups, formation of a coali-
tion might be justified in terms of minimis-
ing the overall uncertainty that might exist
when no communication and joint plan-
ning had existed, which would imply big-
ger operational costs.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1968b). Games with Incomplete
Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, III:
Basic Probability Distribution of the Game.
Management Science , 14 (7), 486. doi:10.1287/
mnsc.14.7.486
Harsanyi, J. C. (1973). Games with Randomly
Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed
Strategy Equilibrium Points. International
Journal of Game Theory , 2 , 1-23. doi:10.1007/
BF01737554
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