Game Development Reference
In-Depth Information
CONCLUSION
It is at this stage that ad hoc or heuristic ap-
proaches are employed that may either attempt
to simplify the complexity of the given context,
or alternate the actual problem to be addressed.
A further implication of this is that all relations
in an education environment (internal and external)
actually and potentially may take the form of a
co-operative game. Working groups (comprised
either by intra- or inter-school personnel) seem to
play an increasingly important role in collaborative
education activities, both at the low 'operational'
level and at the high 'strategic' one. The importance
of this phenomenon is reflected in the emergence
of endogenous pedagogical policy models.
The latter concentrate on the interaction be-
tween working groups of education experts while
the school management tends to keep for itself
the role of the policymaker (or the arbiter?). Of
course, in the case of inter-school working groups,
where education experts are involved in a cross-
school collaboration game, representatives from
the school management boards of the participating
schools may also be included.
These models are typically focussing on
Nash equilibriae of a properly defined game
with complete information, where the various
working groups (paricipants of a collaboration
session) and the school management are the (fully
rational) players.
These issues are of obvious empirical rel-
evance, since neither the set of working groups
(and of the respective collaboration sessions which
they are populating) nor their cardinality appears
to be constant over time. In fact, organisational
maintenance and attracting of new members (or
getting rid of old ones that show sub-performances)
is a continuing concern for such groups.
Moreover, the realism of assuming complete
information and (any type of) sophisticated stra-
tegic behaviour can be seriously questioned given
the complexity of the education environment
being dealt with.
Taking into account that game theory is, after
all, the part of economic theory that focuses not
merely on the strategic behavior of individuals in
economic environments, but also on other issues
that will be critical in the design of economic
institutions, such as;
how information is distributed as ap-
proached by (Harsanyi, 1967, 1968a,
1968b),
the influence of players' expectations and
beliefs and
the tension between equilibrium and effi-
ciency (Myerson, 1983).
In general, game theory has already achieved
important insights into issues such as the design
of business contracts and resource allocation
mechanisms which take into account the some-
times counterintuitive ways in which individual
incentives operate in complex environments hav-
ing decision makers with different information
and objectives.
There have been two means for “confronting”
game theory with evidence: in the laboratory and in
the field. More specifically, in laboratory studies,
expected utility theory, as originally formulated
by von Neumann and Morgenstern (Neumann,
1944), was one of the first subjects to attract the
sustained attention of experimenters.
From the very beginning this effort has both
provided indications of the extent to which the
predictions of the theory are approximate guides
to individual choice behavior, and identified par-
ticular situations in which a significant proportion
of subjects consistently violate the predictions of
the theory. Using procedures of this kind, experi-
mental methods allow investigators to measure
some of the parameters on which the predictions
of a theory may depend, and which would be
unobservable in non-experimental situations*.
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