Game Development Reference
In-Depth Information
equivalent of a framework and its corresponding
application for use by people who are education
experts, teachers and teaching practitioners. Such
a collaboration 'language' needs to be designed
with at most minimal training requirement
needs. In addition, the collaboration 'language'
is intended to be used as part of a general sys-
tem design and verification cycle (namely, this
of assisting multi-party collaboration and col-
laborative decision-making activities. We want
thus the collaboration framework to act as some
type of a 'controlled language', which education
experts and practitioners would find intuitive to
use, without extensive learning, and which affords
the same immediacy and interactivity as spoken
language, i.e., which can be used without careful
planning and redrafting of the input.
Actually, the idea of introducing change as
the result of evolutionary processes is not new at
all. Furthermore, it can be regarded as one of the
most important consequences of game theory in
that it can be used to determine situations where
one behavior is more fit than all known alterna-
tives, or alternately, a specific mix of behaviors
where no one behavior is more fit than any other
(Friedman, 1991).
In both cases, the result is considered as an
evolutionary stasis with respect to the behaviors
being considered - there is no change in relative
frequency of the employed strategies over time.
These situations are named, according to the game
theoretical terminology as Evolutionarily Stable
Strategies (henceforth: ESSs). More specifically,
in the literature of game theory we identify two
types of ESS:
Decision-Making Assessment
“Pure” ESS is where one strategy totally
out-competes all others. In our case, this
should be read as follows: mastery of a key
process by a specific education environ-
ment, or alternatively, by a specific educa-
tion scheme, should out-compete any other
scheme. That means that regardless of its
frequency, it is always more it than any
known alternative. A strategy that is a pure
ESSs is considered as immune to invasion
by other known strategies. In the old para-
digm of collaborating in a controlled envi-
ronment, such a strategy might be sought
and considered as ideal.
The decision-making assessment determines the
benefit of a particular collaboration decision op-
tions by means of quantitative and qualitative as-
sessments. In literature there are well-established
scenario techniques which allow the impact
analysis of different assumptions with regard to
(any particular) value adding benefits. A result of
this is the creation of preferential roadmaps. This
part of the model has to describe the procedure
of how to develop different scenarios and carry
out an 'environmental' analysis according to the
specific scope and needs of the particular educa-
tion environment under consideration.
What is to be taken for sure is that working
in and with education networks together with the
mastery of key processes enables change in the
school environment through evolutionary pro-
cesses of which an instance is this of our proposed
'Collaboration Game'.
In the current context, change should be re-
garded as an enabling factor for enabling adapta-
tion of an education structure, so that the latter
better responds to external conditions and the
given context.
“Mixed” ESS is where two strategies per-
manently coexist, thus increasing the com-
plexity of the implementation, as in a real
world application any actor should distrib-
ute its resources for achieving a certain /
acceptable level of “mastery” in several
key processes. From a computational per-
spective, in contexts where three or more
strategies to play, it is possible to have a
situation where there is no devisable ESS.
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